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Who	really	cares	about	Northern	Ireland?
This	week	marks	the	20th	anniversary	of	the	Belfast	(Good	Friday)	Agreement.	Katy	Hayward
(Queens	University	Belfast)	considers	the	current	debate	about	whether	Brexit	is	a	threat	to	peace
and	stability	in	Northern	Ireland.	She	argues	that	the	obsession	with	avoiding	physical	infrastructure	at
the	border	represents	a	very	limited	view	of	where	risks	to	the	peace	process	might	come	from.
Hours	after	people	of	all	political	persuasions	–	unionist	and	nationalist,	conservative	and	socialist,
leavers	and	remainers	–	gathered	in	Belfast	to	commemorate	the	20th	anniversary	of	the	Belfast
(Good	Friday)	Agreement,	how	determinedly	counter-current	for	Daniel	Hannan	to	have	this	piece	published	in	the
Sun.	Hannan	took	the	warnings	from	the	Agreement’s	architects	about	the	present	risks	posed	to	it	and	interpreted
them	thus:	‘Remainers	don’t	really	care	about	Ireland…	they	just	want	to	stop	Brexit’.
The	most	striking	thing	about	this	piece	is	that	a	Conservative	MEP	could	bend	an	ear	to	the	expression	of	anxieties
in	Belfast	and	decide	to	hear	them	as	“shrill”	and	disingenuous	remoaning.	In	so	doing,	he	aptly	displays	the	attitude
that	fuels	such	fears.
For	the	narrative	and	drive	towards	‘Brexit	at	any	cost’	naturally	raises	questions	as	to	the	price	that	might	be	paid	for
this	ambition.	As	Hannan	himself	notes	at	the	end	of	his	article,	Brexit	could	come	at	the	cost	of	making	trade
‘harder’.	It	could	conceivably	come	at	a	cost	to	the	Union.	It	could	also	come	at	a	cost	to	the	peace	process.
Far	from	being	the	preserve	of	Europhiles,	warnings	about	the	stability	of	peace	in	Northern	Ireland	have	come	from
all	quarters.	Even	David	Trimble	–	whom	Hannan	lauds	in	this	article	–	has	pointed	to	the	risk	of	provoking	violence
through	Brexit	(in	this	case,	from	loyalists	in	reaction	to	Dublin’s	stance).
Even	if	Hannan	is	right	and	all	sides	are	cynically	exploiting	the	‘fragile	peace’,	it	is	worth	asking:	what	is	the	intended
purpose	of	such	warnings?	Put	most	simply,	unionists	want	to	warn	the	Irish	government	about	the	consequences	of
their	actions;	nationalists	want	to	do	the	same	to	the	British	government.
Warnings	of	provoking	violence	or	civil	disquiet	are	still	a	means	by	which	politicians	in	Northern	Ireland	force	the
British	and	Irish	governments	to	pause	for	thought.	You	don’t	have	to	believe	in	the	imminent	end	of	loyalist	and
republican	ceasefires	to	see	that	this	situation	is	a	sign	of	severe	sickness	in	the	democratic	peace	in	Northern
Ireland.
Why	should	the	avoidance	of	public	disorder	be	what	motivates	government	policy	rather	than,	say,	the	bolstering	of
the	middle	ground,	the	prosperity	of	the	economy,	the	erosion	of	sectarianism	or	the	ending	of	the	‘brain	drain’
through	high	levels	of	school	leaver	and	graduate	emigration?	Because	the	spectre	of	armed	violence	is	a	tactic	that
works	when	it	comes	to	shaping	government	policy	towards	Northern	Ireland.
The	current	approach	to	the	Brexit	‘border	issue’	exemplifies	this	all	too	well.	See,	for	instance,	the	UK	government’s
narrow	interpretation	of	a	‘hard	Irish	border’	to	mean	one	with	physical	infrastructure.	This	is	a	direct	outworking	of	its
wish	to	not	have	anything	on	the	border	that	republican	paramilitaries	can	take	potshots	at.	The	working	assumption
appears	to	be	that	violent	conflict	can	be	averted	merely	by	not	having	obvious	targets	for	that	violence.	But,	of
course,	the	source	of	the	risk	isn’t	that	republican	paramilitaries	particularly	detest	ANPR	cameras.	Nor	would	they
only	object	to	border	checks	if	they	were	to	occur	within	spitting	distance	of	‘the	legal	border’.
The	escalation	of	violence	and	securitisation	at	the	Irish	border	during	the	Troubles	was	intrinsically	connected	to
what	was	happening	elsewhere	in	Northern	Ireland	–	internment,	expulsions,	atrocities.	The	principle	of	the	border	as
a	bellwether	remains	true	today.	Whether	the	border	is	a	point	of	cooperation	or	conflict	is	determined	by	much
broader	policies	and	practices,	all	the	way	up	to	those	of	the	two	governments.	For	what	allows	paramilitary	groups
to	prosper	but	the	failure	to	create	the	conditions	that	prove	‘exclusively	democratic	and	peaceful	means’	to	be	the
best	way	to	pursue	political	goals?
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The	Secretary	of	State	assured	us	on	the	anniversary	of	the	Agreement	that	restoring	devolution	in	Northern	Ireland
was	the	government’s	‘number	one	political	priority’.	Unfortunately,	there	is,	at	the	moment,	far	too	little	publically-
available	evidence	to	support	this	claim.	Brexit	has	dominated	the	political	priorities	of	the	British	government	since
Article	50	was	triggered.	It	has	not	only	driven	the	government’s	agenda,	but	it	has	also	caused	it	to	contract.
Whether	the	Prime	Minister’s	habit	of	dizzyingly-whirlwind	visits	to	Northern	Ireland	arises	from	her	lack	of	time,
comfort	or	interest,	Brexit	is	undoubtedly	a	contributing	factor.
This	is	such	a	pity	because,	in	this	context,	Brexit	should	really	not	be	that	important.	In	Northern	Ireland,	the
landscape	of	democracy	and	sovereignty,	identity	and	borders	is	not	primarily	defined	by	EU	membership.	It	is
defined	by	peace.	Or	by	conflict.
The	future	of	this	place	does	not	lie	in	the	hands	of	paramilitaries.	Nor	can	it	rest	in	the	hands	of	one	political
grouping	to	the	exclusion	of	others.	A	future	for	this	place	lies	in	the	quality	of	democracy,	trust	and	cooperation
across	the	three	‘strands’	of	the	Agreement:	unionist/nationalist,	north/south,	British-Irish.
This	is	an	appropriate	time	to	recall	the	commitment	made	in	the	Agreement	to	‘partnership,	equality	and	mutual
respect	as	the	basis	of	relationships’.	Partnership,	equality	and	mutual	respect	are	not	merely	civilising	principles	for
a	post-conflict	region;	they	are	qualities	for	MLAs,	MPs	and	MEPs	of	all	parties	to	uphold	and	to	demonstrate	in
relationships	across	these	islands.	If	they	really	care	about	Northern	Ireland,	that	is.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of		LSE	Brexit	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.	
Katy	Hayward	is	a	Senior	Lecturer	in	Sociology	at	Queen’s	University	Belfast.
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